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MEASURING THE STABILIZING EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY
PROGRAMS IN SEVEN COUNTRIES, 1955-65*
WAYNE W. SNYDER
N this article we shall measure the sta-
bilizing effects that social security bene-
its and contributions had on economic fluc-
tuations during the eleven-year period from
1955 through 1965 in seven countries: Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The methods used are those developed for
a recent OECD survey by Bent Hansen
[7], which gives the institutional back-
ground to budgetary action and an analy-
sis of the nature and effects of fiscal policy
in these seven member countries. The Han-
sen study generally focuses on the budget
effects of the entire public sector or of
central government alone.' This paper sup-
plements the Hansen study by singling out
the social security functions and comparing
their stabilizing effects with those of the
general government sector as well as with
the conditions which would have been re-
quired to produce completely balanced and
stable growth.
It should be noted that several European
countries began their social security pro-
grams early in the nineteenth century, dec-
ades before the advent of Keynesian eco-
nomics and its concern for economic sta-
bility [15, pp. 123-33 and 18, pp. 1-20].
The "sound" budgetary philosophy which
widely prevailed up to World War II de-
plored deficits generally, and was specifi-
cally suspicious of deficits incurred by the
*The University of Michigan, Center for Re-
search on Economic Development. I am particu-
larly indebted to J. C. R. Dow, who conceived
and directed the OECD study of fiscal policy [6],
and to Bent Hansen, with whom I had the pleas-
ure of working for two years to complete it and
whose comments and suggestions on an earlier
version of this paper were extremely helpful, as
were those of George Write and the referee; I
also benefited from the editorial suggestions of
Janet Eckstein.
1The OECD system of national accounts
[12], which provided the basic data for the
Hansen study, does not distinguish social se-
curity benefits from other government transfers
to households. Our study uses national and other
sources to estimate the net impact of both con-
tributions and benefits of the social security pro-
grams.
social security system during economic re-
cessions. Thus, whatever dampening impact
on cyclical fluctuations in income and ex-
penditures has occurred has not always
been viewed as desirable, and the stabiliz-
ing influence of these programs has been
largely an unintentional by-product. Their
major purpose was and still is to help meet
individual human needs in many ways,
principally through the provision of pen-
sions for the aged and survivors, unem-
ployment and accident insurance, family
allowances, and more recently, medical care.
Social security benefits of this kind have
grown more rapidly than any other cate-
gory of government expenditures, and in
several European countries now account
for more than one-third of all public ex-
penditures and are larger than the current
expenditures of either central or local gov-
ernment [7, p. 89]. In the United States
social security programs are relatively less
important than in most European countries,
and change here has not been as spectacu-
lar in the postwar era; with the introduc-
tion of medical aid for older persons, how-
ever, the differences are likely to diminish.
Important as the individual benefits of
social security programs are, my concern
is with the net impact of benefits and
contributions on income and expenditures
and with the extent to which they help to
stabilize demand. Unemployment compen-
sation has the most obvious anti-cyclical
impact, as payments rise and fall as unem-
ployment increases and decreases, but other
benefits may vary anticyclically too, and
contributions do also. The fact that social
security programs have stabilizing effects
has long - though certainly not always -
been recognized [15, pp. 309-19], and in
the United States these effects continue to
be the subject of considerable research [6,
13, 16 and 19].
I. Measuring the Effects of Social Security
Changes
To measure the effect of any budget
change, it is necessary first to estimate what
would have occurred if there had been no
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change at all and then to compare this
estimate with what actually occurred.'
When government expenditures and rev-
enue change, the effects occur in several
stages. First, there is the direct impact
brought about by the increased (or de-
creased) spending occasioned by the ini-
tial budget change. For social security pro-
grams, when contributions or benefits
change so that household incomes increase,
"leakages" occur to the extent that house-
holds save a portion of their increased in-
come or purchase imported commodities;
only after this does the direct impact on
domestic demand occur. The initial change
then induces a series of indirect or multi-
plier effects.3 The combination of all the
direct and indirect effects, or the total ef-
fect of budget changes can be classified in
two types: discretionary and automatic,
built-in stabilizers. It was, however, only
possible to separate these two kinds of ef-
fects for Germany, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
The model developed by Hansen draws
on the previous contributions of Brown
[2], Hansen [8], Lindbeck [9], and Mus-
grave [10]. Although the Hansen model
is admittedly simple compared with the
large econometric models which have been
developed for some countries (partly be-
cause he wanted to use a common anal-
ysis for each of the seven countries), it is
adequate to measure the relative impor-
tance of various kinds of budget changes
both within and among countries. Due to
the lack of quarterly data for some of the
countries, his model uses only year-to-year
changes, and no lags are introduced. The
model assumes that private investment, ex-
ports, and prices are exogenously deter-
mined. Imports are endogenous and for
some countries (i.e., Belgium and Sweden)
represent the principal leakage of poten-
tial budget effects. The model uses multi-
2For a complete description of the methods
used to measure budgetary effects, see Hansen
[7], Chapter 1.
31n general, "accelerator effects" should be
included too, but (as will be explained later) the
model he used assumed that all changes in
private investment were exogenously determined;
hence the measurement of budget effects is lim-
ited in this respect (as well as in other respects
that will be described below).
pliers of various magnitudes to determine
the total effects for different types of budg-
et changes, after allowing for leakages due
to the estimated marginal propensities for
private saving, imports, and direct and i4
direct taxes.
All models have their deficiencies, and
Hansen's is no exception. In respect to the
social security sector, the most important
features are the lumping together of all
contributions (e.g., by employees and em-
ployers) for whatever type of program
(e.g., in the United States notably OASDI
and State Unemployment Insurance), and
the absence of any distinction among the
many different kinds of benefits that in-
dividuals may receive. Unquestionably a
model which incorporated a greater degree
of disaggregation would be more desirable
because it would permit studying separately
the stabilizing features of the various social
security programs. Unemployment benefits
certainly are the strongest automatic sta-
bilizing component, but there are no clear
reasons why other types of transfer pay-
ments are necessarily counter cyclical al-
though most kinds of contributions prob-
ably are. Unfortunately the data was not
available on the same disaggregated basis
for all countries, and it was decided that it
would be difficult to compare the results
of a detailed analysis for one country with
the more aggregated results for another
country.
For two countries studies have attempted
to distinguish among the various multipli-
ers associated with different types of con-
tributions and benefits. For the United
States, Vroman [19, p. 54] estimated that
the social insurance multipliers for gov-
ernment transfer payments are significantly
larger than those for contributions (under
varying assumptions about the direction of
tax shifting), and hence he concluded that
the long-run balanced budget multiplier for
the social security sector is large and posi
tive [19, p. 63].1 For the United Kin
dom, Balopoulis [1, p. 205] also estimate
multipliers for various National Insurance
41n a different context, Mrs. Teeters [16]
has shown why as many as three different as-
sumptions about social security contributions are
relevant to making estimates of the now fa-
miliar calculations of the "full-employment sur-
plus."
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contribution and benefit rates, but his re-
sults gave no significant differences among
the multipliers for the disaggregated varia-
bles.
The Hansen model is similar in this re-
spect with Balopoulis' investigations be-
cause for each country it uses a unique mul-
tiplier for all changes in social security con-
tributions and benefits. While the multi-
pliers cannot be accepted as being exact or
applicable for every budget change, they
are, nevertheless, sufficiently representative
to indicate relative orders of magnitude
and the range of differences between coun-
tries.5
In most countries the social security sys-
tems are designed to be self-supporting -
at least in the long-run - through pay-as-
you-go employee and employer contribu-
tions, although in practice they rarely are.
The United States is a unique case because
both the federal and the state-local govern-
ment social insurance funds' accounts pro-
duced a surplus for the period from 1955
through 1965 [18, pp. 58-9]. Furthermore,
during the decade of the 1950's deficits in
the social insurance funds' accounts in re-
cession years were approximately offset by
surpluses in the other years, but with only
one recession in the 1960's the accounts
showed a substantial surplus for the decade.
If this becomes an established pattern it
will be another contribution to the "fiscal
drag" associated with the federal govern-
ment's tax system. In each of the other
six countries the central government pro-
vided grants to cover annual deficits, which
in some instances were substantial. Bel-
gium, Germany, France, and Italy have pro-
grams which are intended to be self-sup-
porting, but annual deficits were more the
rule than the exception [11, pp. 142-5]. In
Sweden, on the other hand, most benefits
are systematically and intentionally financed
directly by the central government budget.
Social security contributions traditionally
have provided only a small portion of the
5The multipliers differ, of course, among
countries because of differences in the leakage
coefficients - the marginal propensity to save,
and, especially, the marginal propensity to im-
port. For the seven countries the multipliers used
are: Belgium 0.60, France 1.76, Germany 1.27,
Italy 1.38, Sweden 0.92, the United Kingdom
0.96, and the United States 2.48 [7, p. 47].
total funds required, although since 1960
there has been a movement towards re-
quiring new contributions by the employ-
ers in order to cover a greater proportion
of the costs [7, pp. 346-7 and p. 400].
The United Kingdom's National Insurance
Fund functions with generally small an-
nual government grants [4. p. 47], but this
excludes the National Health Service pro-
gram, which is integrated into the central
government budget and for which specific
contributions provide less than 20 per cent
of the annual cost [4, pp. 42-3]. Because
the Health Service is directly administered
by the central government, its financial
impact is not included in this study. In
addition to the programs administered by
public authorized special social security
agencies, governments also provide direct
relief and public assistance on an individu-
al case basis. This type of social welfare
payment is not included in this study be-
cause it is inseparably mixed with the gen-
eral government budget.6
The total effect of social security pro-
grams results from the deficit or surplus of
the difference between contributions re-
ceived from and benefits paid to the pri-
vate sector, adjusted for the appropriate
multiplier impact. Table 1 gives the total
effect for each year and the average for the
entire eleven-year period. Although in the
United States between 1955 and 1965 the
total effect averaged nil for the period as
a whole, for the reasons previously given,
during the last half of the 1950's the av-
erage impact had a small expansionary ef-
fect which was offset in the early 196 0's
by a generally dampening impact. Finan-
cial deficits frequently occurred in all of
the other six countries, and these produced
an effect that stimulated demand by an
average of +0.1 per cent of GNP annually
for Belgium, Germany, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom, and of +0.2 per cent in
France. The average effect was largest in
Italy, where it amounted to +0.4 per cent
of GNP; but without the single year 1965
when the deficit was particularly large (for
6For further details about European Social
Security systems, see the Joing Economic Com-
mittee report [17], and for a complete descrip-
tion of the rates of contributions and benefits in
Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy see the
Common Market publication [5].
ON
TABLE 1.
Effect of Changes in the Social Security Deficit (Surplus), 1955-65
(expressed as a percentage of GNPt_1)
1955 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 Ave.
Belgium
Total effect -0.7 0.1 -0.3 0.9 1.1 -0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 -1.0 1.2 0.1
France
Total effect 0.5 -0.3 1.4 -1.1 0.0 0.4 -0.7 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.2
Germany
Total effect -- 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.5 -0.1 -0.8 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 -0.2 0.1
Automatic -0.5 -0.2 0.3 0.9 -0.2 -0.8 0.0 -0.1 0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -0.1
Discretionary 0.2 0.2 0.6 -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.2
Italy
Total effect n.a. -0.2 -0.7 1.7 0.6 -0.4 -1.1 1.0 0.1 0.6 2.7 0.4a
Sweden
Total effect -0.3 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.1 -0.2 0.2 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.8 0.1
Automatic -1.3 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 -0.6 -0.3 0.1 0.6 0.0
Discretionary 1.0 0.1 -0.1 0.5 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.1
United Kingdom
Total effect 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
Automatic 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1
Discretionary 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
United States
Total effect -0.4 -0.2 0.3 1.9 -1.1 -0.7 1.3 -0.9 -0.6 -0.1 0.4 0.0
Automatic -0.9 0.0 0.5 1.5 -0.8 0.4 0.4 -0.8 0.4 -0.1 -0.3 0.0







reasons discussed later), the effect would
have averaged only about +0.1 per cent.
Averages are not, however, relevant to the
stabilizing effect, which can only be as-
sessed in terms of year-to-year fluctuations.
II. Evaluating the Stabilizing Effect
Of Social Security
In order to evaluate the stabilizing effect
of social security, it is necessary first to
define what we shall call "potential" sta-
bilization. Potential stabilization could be
conceived in relation to various norms. In
another study, we measured the stabilizing
effects of all general government budget
changes in relation to estimates of full em-
ployment GNP [14]. No government has,
however, systematically used its social se-
curity programs to promote long-term
growth and stability, nor are the automatic
features of social security designed to ac-
complish this objective. Hence, it is more
appropriate to investigate the short-term
stabilization of growth of GNP around its
actual average, although it must be remem-
bered that this may not have been the
most desirable development path.7
Actual GNP is itself partly produced by
the impact of budgetary changes by central
and state-local governments as well as by
the impact of the various social security
programs. Hence, the stabilizing (or de-
stabilizing) effect should not be directly
compared with actual GNP. This study
uses two derived series which help to eval-
uate the social security sector's total effect.
We can construct one hypothetical se-
ries of GNP by subtracting from actual
GNP the total effect in each year for all
government budget changes, estimated by
using different multipliers for the major
7This is clearly so for the United States,
which had the most short-term stabilization of
GNP growth around the trend [7, p. 69], but
the cumulated short-fall of actual GNP below the
full employment potential was greater than for
any other country [14, p. 8]. For the United
Kingdom, the debate over what would have
been a desirable growth rate continues [3 and 7].
Belgium, Germany, and Italy all could have
achieved full employment sooner with different
fiscal policies; hence evaluating the effects of
budgets changes in relation to actual and to full
employment GNP gives different results. Only
for France and Sweden does there seem to be no
substantial differences if either criterion is used.
kinds of budget changes (e.g., direct and
indirect taxes, social security benefits and
contributions, domestic purchases of goods,
etc.)8 The choice of which budget changes
to include was based on what budget poli-
cies seemed to be substantially influenced
by the central government, or to what ex-
tent the finances of central and state-local
budgets were so closely related by tax-shar-
ing systems that separating them would be
more artificial than not. Although differ-
ences among the seven countries range
from the highly centralized governments
of Belgium and France to the case of the
United States where state-local budgets are
determined almost totally without influ-
ence from the federal government, except
for the latter's grants and aids, it seemed
most appropriate to include general gov-
ernment for all countries except the United
States where only the federal government
was used (including, of course, the feder-
ally financed portion of the social security
sector).
This derived series is called the "pure
cycle," because it attempts to estimate what
GNP would have been each year without
any budget impact. The pure cycle still in-
corporates the effects of other government
policies (e.g., monetary and direct controls)
and autonomous forces (e.g., private invest-
ment and exports). Hence, the pure cycle
is not so "pure," but nevertheless it is a
useful analytical construct.
Potential stabilization can then be de-
fined as the absolute difference between
the pure cycle and the average growth of
GNP. Potential stabilization for a given
number of years is simply the cumulated
sum of these annual differences. The total
effect of government budget changes are
defined as stabilizing if actual GNP growth
is closer than the pure cycle to the average
growth rate; otherwise they are destabiliz-
ing.
Another hypothetical series can be
formed by subtracting from the actual GNP
only the total effect of the social security
sector, suggesting how GNP might have
developed in the absence of its impact.
8A table of the multipliers used for each
country to calculate the total effect for various
kinds of government budget changes is con-
tained in Hansen [7, p. 47].
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This new series is identical with one which
can be obtained by adding to the pure cycle
the total effect of central and state-local
government alone. The total effect of so-
cial security is defined as stabilizing if the
actual GNP growth is closer to the average
GNP than it would have been without the
impact of social security; otherwise the ef-
fect is destabilizing. In actual fact, the real
GNP growth and the two derived series in-
tersect to such a degree that figures drawn
to show what occurred for each country re-
quire more effort to interpret than is war-
ranted by providing a visual basis for com-
parison. Figure 1 has been drawn without
the pure cycle while still retaining actual
and average GNP growth rates, and GNP
minus the total effect of social security (the
dotted line). The absolute difference be-
tween the actual growth of GNP and the
dotted line measures the total effect as
given in Table 1.
Italy and the United States are clearly the
two countries in which the impact of so-
cial security had the greatest influence on
the course of events, but if allowance is
made for the exceptional year (1965) in
Italy, then the relative importance there
was no greater than in Belgium and France.
Social security was modestly important in
Germany and Sweden while it had the
least influence in the United Kingdom. In
order to evaluate the overall stabilizing ef-
fect of social security, the cumulated data
for the entire eleven-year period are sum-
marized in Table 2.
The net stabilizing effects of social se-
security (item 1) show considerable varia-
tion among the seven countries. They are
largest for Italy, the United States, and Bel-
gium (in descending order of importance),
somewhat smaller in Germany, still less in
Sweden, virtually nothing in the United
Kingdom, and on balance destabilizing in
France. The effects are, of course, the net
result of years when social security was a
stabilizing factor and years when it was
destabilizing. In Germany the effects were
stabilizing in all but one year, while in the
other countries they were destabilizing in
three or four years, and in France they were
more often destabilizing than not.
The net stabilizing effects can also be
divided according to whether they result
from automatic or from discretionary
changes in the social security system. Au-
tomatic changes are those differences in
both benefits and contributions which oc-
cur under existing laws and regulations;
discretionary variations can be attributed
to new laws or changes in the existing
structure of benefits and contributions. Nat-
urally, both automatic and discretionary
changes can be either stabilizing or desta-
bilizing. A priori one might expect that
the effects of automatic changes would be
generally anticyclical, whereas governments
might understandably have many factors to
consider in making discretionary changes
in the system, and these might not be con-
sistent with attempting to achieve eco-
nomic stability. The evidence, unfortunate-
ly, is not complete, and what does exist is
not conclusive. It was not possible to make
quantitative estimates of the discretionary
effects of social security for Belgium,
France, and Italy. It is known, however,
that in 1957 major increases in social se-
curity benefits became effective in France
and that these were a major factor caus-
ing the excessive demand that year. Then,
in 1958 new increased contribution rates
were a part of the government's deflation-
ary program, which was, of course, inten-
tionally destabilizing in its immediate im-
pact and without which the subsequent
devaluations of the franc would not have
made sense. In Italy the large change in
social security during 1965 was mostly due
to diminished contribution rates that were
set in an effort to stimulate demand in a
recession year. For both France and Italy,
then, if a rough allowance is made for
these discretionary changes there is no clear
indication that the automatic effects were
any more stabilizing than were the remain-
ing discretionary effects.
There remain four countries for which it
is possible to distinguish the discretionary
from the automatic effects. It is important
to note that for Germany and the United
States virtually all of the net stabilizing
total effects (item 1) are accounted for by
automatic changes (item 2), and the amount
of destabilizing automatic effects is very
small relative to their (gross) stabilizing
effects. The corollary is, of course, that
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1. Net stabilizing total effects 4.9
a. Gross stabilizing 5.5
b. Destabilizing 0.6




3. Potential stabilization 24.2
4. Net stabilizing effects of
general government 3.0
5. Percentage of potential
stabilization achieved
a. General governmentb 24
b. Social Security 20
aCumulated for 1956-65
bThese percentages are not identical with Hansen's


































ary changes were both stabilizing and de-
stabilizing, the net effects were nil for
these two countries. Sweden and the Unit-
ed Kingdom present puzzling cases, because
the (gross) stabilizing and destabilizing au-
tomatic effects approximately offset one an-
other. One factor seems to be certainly
relevant to explaining the differences be-
tween Germany and the United States on
the one hand and Sweden and the United
Kingdom on the other. Economic fluctua-
tions were substantially larger in the first
two countries than in the latter cases (see
Figure 1). Hence, employment varied more
and accordingly there was greater auto-
matic variation in unemployment compen-
sation (and contributions also). Sweden and
the United Kingdom usually ran at full
and often over-full employment, so that
variations in the unemployment insurance
component of social security benefits and
contributions were much less important.
In cases of relatively small fluctuations in
the GNP growth rate, one might expect
variations in the automatic social security
changes to be slight, tending to produce
stabilizing effects in years when the GNP
growth rate exceeds its average and desta-
bilizing effects when it falls below it. This
explanation is roughly corroborated by the
series on changes in automatic effects for
Sweden and the United Kingdom given in
Table 1, but a detailed analysis of the
other components of the social security sys-
tem is required for a complete explanation
of the differences.
The next step in assessing the contribu-
tion of social security programs to helping
maintain economic stability is to cumulate
the annual differences between the pure
cycle and the average GNP growth rate
(item 3), defined earlier as potential sta-
bilization. Fluctuations in the pure cycle
produced considerably more potential sta-
bilization for some countries than for oth-
ers. Over the eleven year period it amount-
ed to almost one-half of a typical year's
GNP for the United States as compared
with about one-third for Germany, one-
quarter for Belgium, Italy and Sweden, but
only one-seventh for France and the United
Kingdom.
Next, before we look at the stabilizing
effects of social security relative to the po-
tential stabilization, it is helpful to appre-
ciate the net stabilizing effects of changes
in general government budgets (item 4),
which include besides social security the ef-
fects of central and state-local governments
as well. Perhaps it is not surprising that
these effects appear to be largest for the
two countries where potential stabilization
was the greatest - Germany and the Unit-
ed States - and smallest where potential
stabilization was the least - France and
the United Kingdom; but even when the
net stabilizing effects of general govern-
ment are expressed as a percentage of po-
tential stabilization (item 5a) some nota-
ble differences remain. Germany, Italy,
Sweden, and the United States form a group
apart, in which the net stabilizing effects
of general government eliminated between
35 and 42 per cent of the pure cycle's po-
tential fluctuations about the average growth
Tate. Belgium and France are next, but
the percentage of potential stabilization
achieved was substantially less, 12 and 13
per cent respectively. The United King-
dom is unique because almost no stabiliza-
tion was achieved - a quantitative evalu-
ation of the effects of the well-known "stop/
go" policies which were followed throughout
that period.
Finally, the stabilizing effects of social
security alone can be expressed as a per-
centage of potential stabilization (item 5b).
The effects were relatively most important
in Italy (27 per cent) and Belgium (20 per
cent). At first this may appear surprising,
but neither country attempted to use the
government budget as an instrument for
maintaining economic stability, and con-
sequently what stabilization was achieved
occurred mainly through the income sta-
bilizing features of the social security sys-
tem. Therefore, it is less surprising that
Germany and the United States are next-
in each case about 10 per cent of the po-
tential stabilization was achieved by the
effects of social security; and in Sweden the
percentage was only slightly less. As pre-
viously mentioned, the social security sys-
tem had virtually no stabilizing effects in
the United Kingdom, and in France the
effects were an important destabilizing fac-
tor (probably more due to discretionary
changes than to any procyclical features in-
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herent in the automatic functioning of the
system).
III. Conclusions
In the process of providing for a number
of important human needs, social security
programs help to maintain household in-
come and thus make a positive contribution
to dampening economic fluctuations. The
relative importance of this contribution
during the period from 1955 through 1965
differed c->nsiderably among the seven
countries studied. In some cases the social
security system was a greater stabilizing
factor than the combined effects of changes
in the central and state-local government
budgets, while in some countries its im-
portance was almost negligible and in at
least one case it exerted a definite desta-
bilizing influence. Considering that in ev-
ery country but the United States the re-
ceipts and expenditures of the social se-
curity system are nearly as large as those
of the central government itself, one might
wonder why the systems' stabilizing effects
were not any larger than they were.
Several factors are relevant, but certainly
one important reason is that the systems
were mostly designed to be self-financing
and the stabilizing features are largely un-
intentional. For those countries where it
is possible to distinguish between automat-
ic and discretionary effects, the former ap-
pear to have been generally stabilizing, but
as often as not discretionary changes have
been destabilizing, because of modifica-
tions in the contribution and benefit rates
at inappropriate times. Another reason is
clearly connected with lags, which this
study made no attempt to evaluate. It is
widely recognized that trends in employ-
ment lag behind production, and conse-
quently so do contributions, which depend
to a large extent on wages; unemployment
benefits also lag, with the result that the
combined effects tend to diminish the in-
herently anticyclical nature of this part
of the social security system. Other pro-
grams - pensions, family allowances, med-
ical assistance, etc. - have smaller cyclical
variations, but a disaggregated analysis is
required before their effects can be prop-
erly evaluated. It must still be concluded,
however, that for each of the seven coun-
tries studied, except France, the impact of
the social security system was a positive
feature, and in some instances was the ma-
jor factor contributing the goal of achiev-
ing economic stability.
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